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THE PREDICAMENT OF THE IMMIGRANT VICTIM/DEFENDANT: 
“VAWA DIVERSION” AND OTHER CONSIDERATIONS IN 
SUPPORT OF BATTERED WOMEN* 
ZELDA B. HARRIS** 
The struggle to combat domestic violence has sustained a modern feminist 
movement that began over thirty years ago.1  The push to prioritize domestic 
violence on the feminist agenda has yielded far-reaching and tangible results in 
a relatively short period.  The passage of the Violence Against Women Act of 
1994 (“VAWA”)2 and the Battered Immigrant Women Protection Act of 2000 
(“VAWA II”)3 is a testament to this fact.  VAWA and VAWA II are a 
culmination of efforts and collaborations made between and across members of 
the feminist and civil rights movement.4  However, as the fanfare over the 
collective rewards fades, serious concerns remain regarding the impact of the 
policies and laws on non-white women who have been subjected to historical 
oppression based on race or national origin.  Unfortunately, poor women of 
color have been left to bear the expense and debts owed from waging a war 
against gender inequality.5 
 
* ©2003 by University of California, Hastings College of the Law.  Reprinted from 14 HASTINGS 
WOMEN’S  L.J. 1, 1-26 (2003) (by permission). 
** Clinical Professor of Law and Director of the Domestic Violence Law Clinic, The University 
of Arizona, James E. Rogers College of Law.  B.S. 1988, Syracuse University; J.D. 1991, 
Washington University School of Law.  The author wishes to thank all of the students who have 
spent tireless, dedicated hours providing quality representation to victims of domestic violence in 
Southern Arizona.  The author wishes to extend particular gratitude to the following students and 
colleagues that found time to assist with research in this area: Mary Day, Bertha Fresquez, Pete 
Gutierrez, Valerie Hink, Lynn Marcus, and Andrea Montavan Mc-Killip. 
 1. Jenny Rivera, The Violence Against Women Act and the Construction of Multiple 
Consciousness in the Civil Rights and Feminist Movements, 4 J.L. & POL’Y 463, 476 (1996). 
 2. Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, tit. IV, 
108 Stat. 1796, 1902-55 (codified in various provisions of titles 8, 16, 18, and 42 of the United 
States Code). 
 3. Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-386, tit. V, 
114 Stat. 1464, 1518-37 (codified in title 8 of the United States Code). 
 4. Rivera, supra note 1, at 491. 
 5. See generally id. (providing a detailed discussion of the often conflicting interests of the 
feminist movement and the civil rights movement with respect to the Violence Against Women 
Act). 
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One example of the damage is the effect of mandatory misdemeanor 
domestic violence prosecution policies on women who have immigrated to the 
United States with abusive U.S. citizen or legal permanent resident spouses.6  
The mandatory policies, lobbied for by anti-domestic violence advocates, have 
effectively disabled immigrant women from securing the personal freedom 
needed to gain the very safety for themselves and their children that the 
movement promised.7 
The following essay seeks to shed light on some of the unintended 
consequences of mandatory prosecution policies as gleaned from my 
experience representing battered women in the Domestic Violence Law Clinic 
in Tucson, Arizona.8  Tucson is located in close proximity to the border of 
Mexico.  Consequently, many of the clients served by the Clinic are recent 
immigrants from Mexico and other Latin American countries.9 
Any interaction with the criminal justice system can have permanent 
consequences for immigrants seeking permanent residence or citizenship in 
this country.10  The current domestic violence laws and policies, in an effort to 
effectuate color- and gender-blind justice, treat the female immigrant 
defendant the same as the male, non-immigrant defendant.  The imposition of 
 
 6. See Cecelia M. Espenoza, No Relief for the Weary: VAWA Relief Denied for Battered 
Immigrants Lost in the Intersections, 83 MARQ. L. REV. 163, 185-86 (1999) (arguing that VAWA 
encourages mandatory arrest practices and the arrest of the primary aggressor, which often results 
in the arrest of the immigrant woman due to police bias). 
 7. See id. at 188-89. 
 8. The Domestic Violence Law Clinic [hereinafter Clinic] is a teaching law office, staffed 
primarily by senior law students who are supervised by the Clinic Director.  See The University 
of Arizona, James E. Rogers College of Law, About the Domestic Violence Law Clinic, at 
http://www.law.arizona.edu/Depts/Clinics/DVC/clinic.htm (last visited Jan. 6, 2004).  The Clinic 
is part of the clinical course curriculum at The University of Arizona, James E. Rogers College of 
Law in Tucson, Arizona.  Id.  The Clinic provides direct legal representation and advice to 
victims of domestic violence in southern Arizona in collaboration with Southern Arizona Legal 
Aid, Inc. (the local civil legal service provider) and anti-domestic violence victim advocacy and 
shelter service providers in the community.  Id.  Initial client interviews are conducted on-site at 
battered women’s shelters.  Id.  The clients are pre-screened by shelter advocates to meet baseline 
eligibility requirements for domestic violence services.  Id.  In 1998, when I began my work as 
the director of the Clinic, I expected that the great majority of clients interviewed and provided 
with legal representation would be women seeking various forms of civil relief from the court.  
While this expectation has held true, an unexpected observation emerged.  The Clinic provided a 
notable amount of services to women who had been charged with criminal acts of misdemeanor 
domestic violence.  Conversely, the same women had been identified by shelter advocates as 
victims of domestic violence, not perpetrators. 
 9. See generally TUCSON PLANNING DEPARTMENT, PIMA COUNTY/TUCSON RACE AND 
ETHNICITY1999-2000 COMPARISONS REPORT (2001), available at http://www.ci.tucson.az.us/ 
planning/demo.htm.  The most recent census for the area reports that over 35% of the population 
in the City of Tucson is Hispanic.  Id. 
 10. Espenoza, supra note 6, at 176. 
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mandatory prosecution policies on battered immigrant women who find 
themselves defendants in criminal court has overly harsh and unwarranted 
results.11  The typical criminal defendant represented by the Clinic is a poor, 
recently immigrated, non-English speaking woman with children.  That typical 
client is a survivor of domestic violence at the hands of the person who stands 
as a “victim” in criminal court. 
The following article examines a representative case involving a battered 
immigrant woman facing prosecution for a misdemeanor crime of domestic 
violence.  Sections II and III examine the debate regarding mandatory state 
intervention in violent relationships.  Sections IV and V provide an overview 
of the current domestic violence laws and policies in place in Arizona and an 
examination of the application of the various policies to the representative 
case.  Section VI analyzes the typical responses of battered immigrant women 
to an incident of violence.  Section VII examines the consequences of an arrest 
for misdemeanor domestic violence for a battered immigrant woman.  Finally, 
this article calls for the use of a strategy referred to as “VAWA diversion”12 in 
misdemeanor cases of domestic violence involving battered immigrant women 
as defendants. 
I.  ROSA’S PROFILE: A CASE ILLUSTRATION13 
Rosa, age twenty-two, was born in the city of Sonora, Mexico.  Prior to her 
arrival in Tucson, Rosa resided in a small bungalow-style home with her 
mother, two of her brothers, and the brothers’ wives and children.  Rosa 
completed six years of formal education in Mexico, spoke only Spanish, and 
worked primarily as a domestic worker for some of the wealthier families in 
her community.  She had never been married and had no children before 
coming to the United States. 
Rosa met Francisco, forty-one, three years ago when he was visiting 
friends in Sonora.  Francisco had been married and divorced twice, but he had 
no children.  He held dual citizenship in the U.S. and Mexico.  Francisco easily 
convinced Rosa to leave the security of her family and all that was familiar to 
her to live with him in the U.S.  Francisco had a job and a single-family home 
in Tucson.  Rosa and Francisco were married in a religious and civil ceremony 
in Mexico.  Despite her reluctance to leave her family, Francisco assured Rosa 
 
 11. See id. at 175-81, 193-94 (discussing possible immigration consequences resulting from 
domestic abuse convictions). 
 12. VAWA diversion is a term this author first heard used by court advocates working at 
The Brewster Center Domestic Violence Services, Inc. in Tucson, Arizona.  The concept is 
explained further at infra Section VII. 
 13. Rosa’s case is a hypothetical based on my experiences in the Clinic representing 
immigrant victims of domestic violence who are charged with acts of misdemeanor domestic 
violence in southern Arizona. 
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that he would help her acquire U.S. citizenship, allowing her to travel freely to 
and from Mexico. 
Within the first two years of her arrival in Tucson, Rosa gave birth to two 
children.  However, Francisco had either intentionally refused or neglected to 
file the requisite documents with the United States Bureau of Citizenship and 
Immigration Services14 that would provide Rosa with a form of legal status in 
this country.  When Rosa questioned Francisco about his lack of efforts to 
secure her legal status, he insisted that if she worked harder in the home and 
stopped being so concerned with learning to speak English, socializing with 
women in the neighborhood, or dressing, acting, and talking like an American, 
then maybe they could succeed in this country.  Believing in the dream, Rosa 
retreated. 
Domestic violence does not interrupt a relationship suddenly like an 
uninvited guest.  Instead, it is a disease that grows steadily and consistently 
throughout our communities.  It is regularly nurtured by racial and cultural 
oppression, misogyny, homophobia, and socially condoned violence in our 
community.15  The pressures visited upon the newly immigrated family, 
including pressure to conform and assimilate while holding true to cultural 
traditions, can be overwhelming.16  Although this stress is not an excuse or 
justification for domestic violence, it must be understood as the context in 
which violence occurs. 
II.  THE PUSH FOR MANDATORY INTERVENTION 
TO COMBAT DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 
Historically, violence in the home has been hidden from public view due to 
societal resistance, supported by law, against intrusion into the sphere of 
family privacy.17  Advocates working in the anti-domestic violence movement 
viewed transferring domestic violence from a private concern to a public 
 
 14. On March 1, 2003, the Immigration and Naturalization Service [hereinafter INS] became 
the United States Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services [hereinafter USCIS] and is 
now part of the Department of Homeland Security. 
 15. See generally MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN & ROXANNE MYKITIUK, THE PUBLIC 
NATURE OF PRIVATE VIOLENCE (1994) (providing an exceptional compilation of feminist 
writings addressing domestic violence). 
 16. See generally George A. Martinez, Latinos, Assimilation and the Law: A Philosophical 
Perspective, 20 CHICAGO-LATINO L. REV. 1 (1999) (discussing assimilation as a powerful force 
in America and arguing that the law should not demand full assimilation at the expense of cultural 
traditions). 
 17. See FINEMAN & MYKITIUK, supra note 15, at xiii.  The parameters of the family 
institution “traditionally set aside as paradigmatically ‘private’ have historically defined a more or 
less bright line across which state or ‘public’ intervention and regulation are considered 
problematic.”  Id. 
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responsibility as central to systemic reform.18  The creation of laws and 
policies to combat domestic violence could not have developed without public 
acceptance that domestic violence is a societal problem that affects the 
community at large.  One such example of these laws is mandatory 
intervention policies, which are those policies developed by prosecutorial 
offices requiring the arrest of abusers, despite the willingness of the victim to 
press charges.19 
Mandatory policies were sought to address two prevailing difficulties in 
combating domestic violence: (1) coercive control tactics used by the abuser to 
prevent the victim from seeking assistance, and (2) resistance by state actors20 
to intervene.21  Laws requiring mandatory intervention, in theory, would 
diminish the abuser’s control over the victim by taking the decision to 
intervene out of the hands of the victim and placing that power in the hands of 
the state.22  Accordingly, no amount of coercion directed against the victim 
could prevent the state from seeking punishment of the abuser for his criminal 
conduct. 
Similarly, it was commonly viewed that resistance by law enforcement 
officers to make arrests and prosecutors to pursue charges was tied to the 
victim’s lack of cooperation in the process, most likely due to the abuser’s 
coercion.23  Additionally, the lack of arrests and prosecutions was tied to 
personal biases of individual state actors resulting in institutional gender bias.24  
Again, mandatory policies were seen as a measure to ensure punishment of the 
offender despite his attempts to exert control over the victim or resistance by 
state actors to take action against the abuser.25 
Ultimately, it can be argued that mandatory intervention policies have 
effectively removed the shield of privacy covering domestic violence.  
 
 18. See Donna Wills, Domestic Violence: The Case for Aggressive Prosecution, 7 UCLA 
WOMEN’S L.J. 173, 173-74 (1997) (arguing in favor of aggressive prosecution because domestic 
violence is a public safety issue, domestic violence victims cannot be relied upon to appropriately 
vindicate the state’s interest in holding batterers responsible for their violence, and prosecutor 
intervention is necessary to prevent further batterer intimidation and coercion). 
 19. Id. at 173. 
 20. By “state actors,” I mean those persons and institutions in positions of legal authority 
that are required, by law, to respond to domestic violence.  These individuals include law 
enforcement officers, prosecutors, and judges. 
 21. See generally Wills, supra note 18 (analyzing the arguments in favor of mandatory 
prosecution policies); Joan Zorza, The Criminal Law of Misdemeanor Domestic Violence, 1970-
1990, 83 J. CRIM L. & CRIMINOLOGY 46 (1992) (providing a historical account of the 
development of misdemeanor domestic violence policies). 
 22. Wills, supra note 18, at 180. 
 23. Id. at 179-80. 
 24. Espenoza, supra note 6, at 186. 
 25. Wills, supra note 18, at 180. 
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Domestic violence is now viewed as a legitimate and serious public problem.26  
State laws and policies have clearly defined a level of conduct and behavior in 
intimate relationships that will not be tolerated.27  Finally the abuser’s ability to 
control the outcome of state intervention has been curtailed as decision-making 
power has been transferred from the individual victim to the state.28 
III.  RESPONSES IN OPPOSITION TO MANDATORY INTERVENTION POLICIES 
Despite general agreement by advocates in the anti-domestic violence 
movement that family violence issues should be viewed as a public concern, 
there is disagreement over how such public intervention should occur.29  
Responses in opposition to mandatory intervention fall under two central 
themes.  First, victim self-determination and trust in her decision-making 
abilities are not recognized under a mandatory intervention scheme.30  Second, 
the mandatory policies harm minority communities that have suffered 
historical oppression based on race and national origin to the detriment of both 
abuser and victim.31 
First, with regard to victim self-determination, mandatory policies 
admittedly move the decision to take action against the abuser from the victim 
to the state.  However, to the extent that these policies were constructed in 
response to perceived coercive control tactics utilized by the abuser over the 
victim, the policies fail to acknowledge other reasons for the victim’s 
reluctance to participate in the process.  Particularly, it has been asserted that 
 
 26. Cf. American Bar Association Commission on Domestic Violence, Organization 
Resource Information, at http://www.abanet.org/domviol/resourceinformation.html (last visited 
Jan. 6, 2004) (listing state-wide domestic violence coalitions in all fifty states, Puerto Rico, and 
the Virgin Islands). 
 27. See Wills, supra note 18, at 182. 
 28. Id. at 180. 
 29. Compare Linda G. Mills, Mills on Mandates, Reel Two, 6 DOMESTIC VIOLENCE REP. 17 
(2001), and Linda G. Mills, The Case Against Mandatory State Interventions: A Reply to Evan 
Stark, 6 DOMESTIC VIOLENCE REP. 1 (2000) [hereinafter Mills, Reply to Evan Stark], and Linda 
G. Mills, Killing Her Softly: Intimate Abuse and the Violence of State Intervention, 113 HARV. L. 
REV. 550 (1999) [hereinafter Mills, Killing Her Softly] (arguing that mandatory intervention 
needs to be reconsidered and that battered women are safest when they are given the choice as to 
whether or not to prosecute their batterer), with Evan Stark, Do Mandated State Interventions 
Contribute to Woman Battering?, 5 DOMESTIC VIOLENCE REP. 65 (2000) (criticizing Mills’s 
arguments against mandatory state intervention as lacking evidential support). 
 30. Mills, Reply to Evan Stark, supra note 29, at 14. 
 31. See generally Mills, Killing Her Softly, supra note 29 (providing extensive treatment of 
the arguments against mandatory prosecution); Linda G. Mills, Intuition and Insight: A New Job 
Description for the Battered Woman’s Prosecutor and Other More Modest Proposals, 7 UCLA 
WOMEN’S L.J. 183 (1997) [hereinafter Mills, Intuition and Insight], Linda G. Mills, On the Other 
Side of Silence: Affective Lawyering for Intimate Abuse, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 1225 (1996) 
[hereinafter Mills, Affective Lawyering]. 
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victims do not seek state intervention due to their mistrust in the system.32  
Victim lack of confidence in state intervention is rational given that traditional 
methods of addressing domestic violence (i.e. mediation, cite and release, 
delay)33 may have led to increased risk of violence to the victim.34  Critics of 
mandatory intervention argue that the policies do not defer to the victim when 
pursuing punishment against the abuser that will have consequences for the 
victim and her family.35  For example, policies resulting in the abuser having a 
criminal record of arrest and conviction may have a direct impact on his ability 
to secure employment and provide support for the victim and her children.  
Further, it has been argued that mandatory policies entrench negative 
stereotypes of women and their ability to make rational decisions concerning 
family violence.36  On the one hand, mandatory intervention is seen as 
necessary to address the problem of women dropping charges because of 
coercion by the abuser.37  On the other hand, the policies may be overly 
controlling by dictating a certain outcome without regard to the legitimate 
reasons women may have for not seeking relief through the criminal justice 
system.38 
Second, there are concerns about the impact of mandatory prosecution 
policies on communities of racial and ethnic minorities that have suffered 
historical oppression through the operation of discriminatory laws and 
policies.39  Although mandatory intervention policies are facially non-
discriminatory, it can be argued that to the extent that the policies are based on 
a criminal justice model, they have a greater impact on members of minority 
communities.40  Addressing racially discriminatory practices by state actors 
has long been on the agenda of civil rights organizations.41  Accordingly, 
reliance on a criminal justice model to address domestic violence does not 
recognize the oppression faced by minority communities that include not only 
 
 32. See Mills, Affective Lawyering, supra note 31, at 1226-27 (noting that only 14% of 
women who are severely abused ever call the police). 
 33. Zorza, supra note 21, at 47-48. 
 34. See id. at 50. 
 35. See Mills, Intuition and Insight, supra note 31, at 184 (explaining that minority women 
in particular may be ostracized by their community and family for reporting domestic violence). 
 36. Id. 
 37. Wills, supra note 18, at 181-82. 
 38. See Mills, Intuition and Insight, supra note 29, at 184-85 (noting various reasons why a 
woman may choose not to prosecute her abuser beyond coercion). 
 39. See Zanita E. Fenton, Domestic Violence in Black and White: Racialized Gender 
Stereotypes in Gender Violence, 8 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 1, 49-50 (1998). 
 40. See Mills, Reply to Evan Stark, supra note 6, at 2, 14. 
 41. See Rivera, supra note 1, at 506 (arguing that mandatory prosecution furthers the 
invasive state law model, which has proved “debilitating for communities of color and women”). 
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abusers but victims and their children as well.42  Mandatory policies do not 
take into account the reluctance of minority women to trust that the criminal 
justice system will mete out justice in a fashion that is both fair and just.43 
IV.  THE LEGAL DEFINITION OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE IN ARIZONA 
The determination of whether a particular crime will be labeled an act of 
domestic violence depends on the relationship between the victim and 
offender.  The Arizona Criminal Code lists some eighteen separate offenses 
that can be classified as acts of domestic violence.44  The crimes include 
assault and aggravated assault,45 harassment and aggravated harassment,46 
stalking,47 threatening and intimidating,48 using the telephone to harass,49 
disorderly conduct,50 kidnapping,51 unlawful imprisonment,52 trespass,53 
criminal damage,54 endangerment,55 dangerous crimes against children,56 
 
 42. See Fenton, supra note 39, at 49. 
 43. See id. at 51-54 (explaining that minority communities embrace a general distrust for the 
justice system). 
 44. ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-3601 (2003). 
“Domestic violence” means any act which is a dangerous crime against children as 
defined in section 13-604.01 or an offense defined in sections 13-1201 through 13-1204, 
13-1302 through 13-1304, 13-1502 through 13-1504 or 13-1602, § 13-2810, section 13-
2904, subsection A, paragraph 1, 2, 3, or 6, § 13-2916 or sections 13-2921, 13-2921.01, 
13-2923, 13-3019, 13-3601.02 or 13-3623, if any of the following applies:  (1) The 
relationship between the victim and the defendant is one of marriage or former marriage 
or of persons residing or having resided in the same household, (2) The victim and the 
defendant have a child in common, (3) The victim or the defendant is pregnant by the 
other party, (4) The victim is related to the defendant or the defendant’s spouse by blood 
or court order as a parent, grandparent, child, grandchild, brother or sister or by marriage 
as a parent-in-law, grandparent-in-law, stepparent, step-grandparent, stepchild, step-
grandchild, brother-in-law or sister-in-law, or (5) The victim is a child who resides or has 
resided in the same household as the defendant and is related by blood to a former spouse 
of the defendant or to a person who resides or who has resided in the same household as 
the defendant. 
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-3601(A) (2003). 
 45. Id. §§ 13-1203 – 13-1204. 
 46. Id. §§ 13-2921 – 13-2921.01. 
 47. Id. § 13-2923. 
 48. Id. § 13-1202. 
 49. ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-2916 (2003). 
 50. Id. § 13-2904. 
 51. Id. § 13-1304. 
 52. Id. § 13-1303. 
 53. Id. §§ 13-1502 – 13-1504. 
 54. ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-1602 (2003). 
 55. Id. § 13-1201. 
 56. Id. § 13-604.01. 
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custodial interference,57 child abuse,58 and interfering with judicial 
proceedings.59  In addition, contributing to the delinquency or dependency of a 
minor is a crime frequently charged in connection with acts of domestic 
violence that occur in the presence of children.60 
V.  MANDATORY INTERVENTION LAWS AND POLICIES IN PLACE IN ARIZONA 
The following section outlines the mandatory intervention laws and 
policies in place in Arizona concerning domestic violence in the areas of 
reporting, arrest, prosecution, and sentencing. 
A. Reporting 
Arizona law does not specifically mandate the reporting of acts of 
domestic violence committed against an adult victim.61  Instead, physicians are 
under a legal obligation to report to law enforcement any “material injury” that 
appears to be the result of an unlawful act.62  Therefore, only adult domestic 
violence victims who are present at a hospital or emergency room with serious 
physical injuries and are willing to disclose the origin of their injuries are 
likely to have their cases reported to law enforcement by a physician.  As the 
majority of domestic violence incidents do not involve serious physical 
injury,63 it is safe to assume that most cases of domestic violence observed by 
physicians and hospital staff are not reported to law enforcement.  However, in 
the service area of the Clinic, many health care facilities have adopted a 
universal domestic violence screening protocol for female patients.64  Women 
who are not suffering a material injury but disclose the existence of domestic 
violence during the screening process are referred to professionals within the 
institution or the larger community who are experienced in the field of 
 
 57. Id. § 13-1302. 
 58. Id. §§ 8-201, 13-3623. 
 59. ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-2810 (2003). 
 60. Id. § 13-3612. 
 61. See, e.g., id. § 13-3806. 
 62. Id. 
 63. RONET BACHMAN, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, VIOLENCE 
AGAINST WOMEN: A NATIONAL CRIME VICTIMIZATION SURVEY REPORT 8 (1994).  Table 14 of 
the study reports that 34% of single-offender violent crime victimizations of women involved 
injury, but only 3% could be classified as serious (gunshots or knife wounds, broken bones, loss 
of teeth, internal injuries, loss of consciousness, and undetermined injuries requiring two or more 
days of hospitalization).  Id. 
 64. See Memorandum from the Arizona Coalition Against Domestic Violence, Health Care 
Provider/Hospital Reporting of Domestic Violence and Sexual Assault to Law Enforcement (May 
1997) (on file with author) (explaining the duties of a health care provider in assisting victims of 
domestic violence or sexual assault). 
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domestic violence.65  Attempts have been made by anti-domestic violence 
advocates to secure the enactment of mandatory domestic violence reporting 
legislation, but the attempts have not yielded results to date.66 
B. Arrest 
Mandatory arrest of domestic violence offenders is required in Arizona 
where probable cause exists to believe that a victim has been physically injured 
and/or a weapon is found on the scene.67  Further, law enforcement officers 
have discretion to make an arrest without a warrant whenever they believe 
probable cause exists to support any act of domestic violence.68  Police officers 
are not required to delay taking action by seeking a warrant.69  Also, officers 
do not have to personally observe the incident in order to affect an arrest 
without a warrant.70  The Arizona law in this regard is in line with national 
trends to treat domestic violence as a crime to be addressed rigorously through 
the criminal justice system, instead of mediated through temporary separation 
of the parties.71  It is the routine practice of law enforcement agencies in 
Tucson to make arrests without warrants where they possess probable cause to 
believe an incident of domestic violence has occurred.72  However, state and 
local advocates have raised concern over implementation of the mandatory 
arrest laws.73 
Additionally, the law mandates that police officers take domestic violence 
offenders into custody once arrested, as opposed to issuing a citation and 
releasing the abuser from the scene.74  Again, the law in this regard is in line 
with national trends and is directly responsive to criticisms raised by the anti-
 
 65. Sandy Davenport, Address to the Domestic Violence Law Clinic, James E. Rogers 
College of Law, The University of Arizona (Mar. 22, 2001) (materials provided by speaker on 
file with author). 
 66. See Memorandum from the Arizona Coalition Against Domestic Violence, supra note 
64, at 1. 
 67. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-3601(B) (2003). 
 68. See id. 
 69. See id. 
 70. Id. 
 71. For an exceptional historical analysis of the lobbying for mandatory arrest policies by the 
anti-domestic violence movement see generally Barbara Fedders, Lobbying for Mandatory-Arrest 
Policies: Race, Class, and the Politics of the Battered Women’s Movement, 23 N.Y.U. REV. L. & 
SOC. CHANGE 281 (1997). 
 72. See Tucson Police Department General Orders, 2 General Operating Procedures, Arrest 
Policy No. 2100, § 2112.7 (May 2001) (on file with author). 
 73. See GOVERNOR’S TASK FORCE AGAINST DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 
IN ARIZONA EXECUTIVE SUMMARY REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS 10 (Feb. 1988); see 
generally CLEGG & ASSOCIATES, TUCSON/PIMA COUNTY DOMESTIC VIOLENCE SYSTEM DESIGN 
(Dec. 1995) (on file with author). 
 74. ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-3601(I) (2003). 
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domestic violence movement that police officers were not treating abusers as 
criminal actors when they were released from the scene without citation or 
detention.75 
C. Prosecution 
In the service area of the Clinic, domestic violence misdemeanor 
prosecutions are handled by two separate prosecution agencies.76  Generally, 
domestic violence prosecution policies can be divided into three categories: (1) 
hard/no-drop policies where victims can be forced to testify against their 
abusers; (2) pro-prosecution jurisdictions where victim participation is 
encouraged, and a case may proceed in her absence if the evidence can support 
such action; and (3) soft prosecution policies which provide a victim with 
supportive services to encourage her participation, but which ultimately yield 
to the victim’s decision on whether or not to proceed.77  Both prosecuting 
agencies in the Clinic service area are committed to “pro-prosecution” policies 
with intermittent use of hard/no-drop practices.  In other words, when the 
evidence in a case of domestic violence supports the likelihood of a conviction, 
prosecution of the offender will be sought despite any request made by the 
victim that the case be dropped.  At times, individual prosecutors may seek to 
invoke the contempt power of the court to compel or punish reluctant victims 
who fail to appear at trial to testify against their abusers as required by 
subpoena. 
D. Sentencing 
A criminal defendant entering the system on a misdemeanor domestic 
violence assault charge as a first time offender could, in theory, be allowed to 
compromise the case or participate in an approved diversion program.78  
 
 75. Fedders, supra note 71, at 287-90. 
 76. The Office of the Pima County Attorney is responsible for the prosecution of 
misdemeanor crimes that occur within the county of Pima.  The Office of the Tucson City 
Attorney is responsible for the prosecution of misdemeanor offenses that occur within the city 
limits of Tucson. 
 77. See Gena L. Durham, The Domestic Violence Dilemma: How Our Ineffective and Varied 
Responses Reflect Our Conflicted Views of the Problem, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 641, 650-57 (1998).  
See generally Casey Gwinn & Anne O’Dell, Stopping the Violence: The Role of the Police 
Officer and the Prosecutor, 20 W. ST. U. L. REV. 298, 308-11 (1993); Cheryl Hanna, No Right To 
Choose: Mandated Victim Participation in Domestic Violence Prosecutions, 109 HARV. L. REV. 
1849 (1996). 
 78. The law concerning misdemeanor compromise in Arizona can be found at Arizona 
Revised Statute section 13-3981.  Pursuant to subsection (B) of that code provision, “If a 
defendant is accused of an act involving assault, threatening or intimidating or a misdemeanor 
offense of domestic violence . . . the offense shall not be compromised except on recommendation 
of the prosecuting attorney.”  ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-3981(B) (2003) (emphasis added).  The 
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Mandatory jail time is required for abusers who have been convicted of two or 
more separate offenses of domestic violence within five years.79  Further, all 
persons convicted, either through trial or plea bargain, of an act of domestic 
violence must complete a domestic violence offender treatment program 
approved by the Department of Health Services or a probation department.80  
Both prosecuting agencies in Tucson have internal office policies that strongly 
deter the use of the compromise process in domestic violence cases.81 
The plea bargaining process in domestic violence cases, which includes 
diversion, has received a mixed response from the advocate community.82  
Statewide, anti-domestic violence advocates made a recommendation against 
the use of plea-bargaining and compromise in domestic violence cases.83  
However, Tucson advocates called for the encouragement of better evidence 
collection efforts to encourage plea bargaining by offenders.84  The difference 
in recommendations could be explained by the realization among Tucson 
advocates, some eight years after the initial state-wide recommendation, that 
the criminal justice system may not have been able to effectively or efficiently 
conduct a trial for every misdemeanor domestic violence case pursued by the 
 
statutory scheme regarding diversion in domestic violence cases is found at Arizona Revised 
Statutes section 13-3601, subsection (M).  The relevant portions of that subsection read as 
follows: 
If the defendant is found guilty of an offense included in domestic violence and if 
probation is otherwise available for that offense, the court may, without entering a 
judgment of guilt and with the consent of the defendant, defer further proceedings and 
place the defendant on probation or intensive probation, as provided in this subsection. 
Id. § 13-3601(M). 
 79. See id. §13-3601.02. 
 80. See id. §13-3601.01. 
 81. A statement from the Tucson City Attorney’s Office includes the following language: 
“TYPES OF CASES THAT CANNOT BE DISMISSED PURSUANT TO A MISDEMEANOR 
COMPROMISE: Assaults against police officers; Any case involving DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 
or INDECENT EXPOSURE; Violations of Protective or Harassment Orders; Custodial or 
Visitation Interference; and crimes in which the victim is a child.”  Statement from the Tucson 
City Attorney’s Office, Criminal Misdemeanor Compromise Instructions (1994) (on file with 
author) (emphasis in original).  The Office of the Pima County Attorney has a similar written 
policy regarding misdemeanor compromise.  Statement from the Office of the Pima County 
Attorney (on file with author).  That policy includes the following statement: “Misdemeanor 
compromise does not automatically apply to assault or domestic violence cases.  However, it may 
apply in some of those cases.  Prior approval of the prosecutor must be obtained before such will 
be allowed.”  Id. (emphasis removed). 
 82. The practice of plea bargaining typically involves the defendant pleading guilty to one or 
more offenses in exchange for the state dropping other charges and recommending a lenient 
sentence. 
 83. See GOVERNOR’S TASK FORCE AGAINST DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, supra note 73, at 5. 
 84. See CLEGG & ASSOCIATES, supra note 73, at 56. 
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prosecutor’s office.85 Therefore, the encouragement of plea bargaining may 
have been viewed as a way to reduce the burden on an overloaded judicial 
system while simultaneously resulting in criminal consequences and 
punishment for offenders. 
The remaining sections of this article address the impact of the mandatory 
domestic violence intervention policies on immigrant women.  In particular, 
the article addresses the impact of mandatory misdemeanor prosecution 
policies on the battered immigrant victim in terms of citizenship status, 
employment, and child custody.  While many of the consequences for battered 
immigrant women are suffered comparably by non-immigrant women, the 
plight of immigrant women highlights some of the difficulties inherent in 
enforcing mandatory policies in a manner that is responsive to community 
needs of safety and stability.  The article does not attempt to address the 
question of whether intervention is necessary or required by the state as an 
initial step toward combating domestic violence.  Rather, it assumes that some 
degree of state intervention will occur once the violence in the home is 
publicly disclosed. 
VI.  BATTERED IMMIGRANT WOMEN’S RESPONSES TO DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 
A composite picture can be developed to illustrate some of the common 
responses to domestic violence by battered immigrant Latinas based on the 
collective experience of myself, other clinical faculty members, staff, and 
students.86 
The most common responses of battered immigrant women to domestic 
violence fall into five areas: (1) calling a relative or friend to report abuse by 
intimate partners; (2) leaving the home for a brief period; (3) remaining in the 
home and attempting to pacify the abuser; (4) using methods of self-defense 
against the abuser; and (5) communicating with law enforcement after officers 
have been called to the scene by the abuser or another party.  The composite 
responses, based on experiences in the Clinic, are in line with research studies 
 
 85. During fiscal year 1999-2000, 47,000 criminal misdemeanor cases were processed by the 
municipal court in Tucson.  Hon. Margarita Bernal, Address at the Domestic Violence Law 
Seminar, James E. Rogers College of Law, The University of Arizona (Nov. 5, 2002) (materials 
provided by speaker on file with author).  Additionally, the municipal court is responsible for 
handling civil traffic cases, parking tickets, civil ordinance violations, certain DUI cases, and civil 
domestic violence orders of protection (5,600 processed during reporting period).  Id. 
 86. During the period between 1999 and 2001, the Clinic scheduled initial client intake 
appointments with an average of 428 clients per year.  An examination of 331 cases during that 
time period revealed that 163 clients reported not having United States Citizenship status when 
they sought assistance from the Clinic.  Further, of those 163 clients, 122 reported that Spanish 
was their first language. 
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performed in this area.87  Additionally, Clinic clients generally report that they 
have never or rarely sought the assistance of law enforcement or other state 
institutions due to fear of being reported to the United States Bureau of 
Citizenship and Immigration Services (“USCIS”).  The concerns expressed by 
immigrant women in this regard are completely justified given the severity of 
harms that can result from interaction with the criminal justice system.88 
Another common experience shared by Clinic clients is that their arrest for 
an act of domestic violence was precipitated by an act of violence against them 
by their intimate partner, who then contacted law enforcement in an attempt to 
carry out threats to have the immigrant woman deported.  The threat to have a 
woman deported is recognized as a particular form of domestic violence 
deployed by abusive United States citizen and legal permanent resident 
spouses against their immigrant spouses.89 
And so, we return to Rosa.  The coercive control tactics exercised by 
Francisco with regard to her citizenship are in full cycle.  He promises to file, 
but he does not.  She asks for her papers; he refuses.  She leaves with the 
children to stay with her in-laws; he promises her that he will file the requisite 
papers.  She returns.  Rosa takes work outside the home as a childcare worker 
at a local daycare center to supplement the increasingly limited family income 
and begins to learn a small amount of English.  Francisco’s control is waning, 
and he grows angrier at each argument and threatens physical harm.  He 
accuses Rosa of adultery and other transgressions.  Now he no longer threatens 
physical violence; he uses it against her.  Rosa experiences open-handed slaps 
to the face, pushing and shoving, and sexual contact against her consent 
committed by Francisco.  She does not seek outside assistance for the harms.  
Francisco tells Rosa to conform to his demands or risk further harm, 
deportation, and loss of custody of their American-born children.  During a 
particularly intense episode, Francisco attempts to block the exit to the home as 
Rosa tries to leave with the children, carrying the youngest in her arms.  In 
response, Rosa yells at Francisco, demanding that he let her leave the home.  
She pushes him away from the door and scratches him in the face.  When the 
monolingual English-speaking police finally arrive, they find Rosa afraid and 
unable to communicate effectively with them.  Francisco, a fluent English 
speaker, is able to tell his story to the police with clarity and conviction. 
 
 87. Mary Ann Dutton et al., Characteristics of Help-Seeking Behaviors, Resources and 
Service Needs of Battered Immigrant Latinas: Legal and Policy Implications, 7 GEO. J. ON 
POVERTY L. & POL’Y 245, 248 (2000). 
 88. For an exceptional analysis of the collision between domestic violence policies and 
immigration law, see generally Espenoza, supra note 6. 
 89. See Dutton et al., supra note 87, at 250-53.  For an appellate court decision detailing this 
particular form of abuse, see Vega-Zazueta v. INS, No. 95-70856, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 17439, 
at *2 (9th Cir. July 10, 1997). 
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VII.  UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES 
A. Arrest and Prosecution of Rosa 
The combined effect of mandatory arrest and prosecution policies results 
in the filing of criminal charges against Rosa.  She is charged with 
misdemeanor assault, disorderly conduct, and contributing to the delinquency 
and dependency of a minor.90 
Perhaps better, culturally-appropriate training would have prevented the 
arrest of Rosa.  However, Rosa’s arrest, detention, and prosecution will serve 
to add credibility to Francisco’s threats of deportation and loss of child 
custody. 
In Tucson, persons in Rosa’s position as defendants accused of 
misdemeanor domestic violence are typically not afforded legal representation 
through the public defender’s office.91  Accordingly, it is safe to assume that 
Rosa will not be aware of the myriad of negative consequences that can result 
from her prosecution.  Additionally, given the mandatory prosecution policies 
in place, any efforts made by Francisco to prevent the prosecution of Rosa, 
albeit not entirely for benevolent reasons, will not be effective.  In fact, 
Francisco may be subject to criminal punishment himself if he fails to testify 
against Rosa at trial.  In order to terminate her involvement in the criminal 
justice system, Rosa will either have to accept a plea offer, including diversion, 
or seek a trial.92 
 
 90. Arizona Revised Statute section 13-1203 provides: 
A.  A person commits assault by: 
1.  Intentionally, knowingly or recklessly causing any physical injury to another 
person; or 
2.  Intentionally placing another person in reasonable apprehension of imminent 
physical injury; or 
3.  Knowingly touching another person with the intent to injure, insult or provoke 
such person. 
B. Assault committed intentionally or knowingly pursuant to subsection A, paragraph 1 is 
a class 1 misdemeanor.  Assault committed recklessly pursuant to subsection A, paragraph 
2 is a class 2 misdemeanor.  Assault committed pursuant to subsection A, paragraph 3 is a 
class 3 misdemeanor. 
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-1203 (2003). 
 91. Jeff Klotz, Address at the Domestic Violence Law Clinic, James E. Rogers College of 
Law, The University of Arizona (Feb. 8, 2000) (materials provided by speaker on file with 
author).  Jeff Klotz is an attorney at the Tucson Public Defender’s Office.  Id. 
 92. Diversion in domestic violence cases is specifically provided for under Arizona Revised 
Statute section 13-3601, subsection (M).  ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-3601(M) (2003).  The primary 
difference between diversion and the plea bargain is that under diversion, successful completion 
of the terms of probation prevents the entry of a finding of guilt against the defendant, and the 
case is dismissed.  With respect to trial, defendants charged with misdemeanor domestic violence 
offenses are not entitled to a jury trial.  See State ex rel. McDougal v. Strohson, 945 P.2d 1251, 
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Therefore, despite the fact that mandatory laws and policies were put into 
place to aid victims of domestic violence, they can prove to be a rigid trap for 
women unable to successfully navigate the system.  An argument can be made 
that Rosa’s actions did, in fact, constitute assault and not an act of self-defense.  
However, no serious doubt can exist about the fact that Rosa is a victim of 
domestic violence at the hands of Francisco.  She is a victim/defendant.93  Yet, 
assuming that her actions were unlawful, mandatory prosecution policies that 
provide a one-size-fits-all solution for all offenders will not result in the 
reduction of domestic violence tactics used by Francisco against Rosa.  
Instead, it is likely that Rosa will be deterred from seeking assistance from the 
state in any future domestic violence circumstance.  Even more disturbing, 
Francisco has no incentive to alter his behavior.  In fact, mandatory policies 
that do not allow for prosecutorial discretion in these types of cases result in 
the state’s unwitting enhancement of an abuser’s ability to exert control over 
his victim. 
B. The Availability of VAWA Relief for Rosa 
Any final case disposition short of total acquittal or dismissal of the 
criminal charges against Rosa may result in grave immigration consequences.  
In Rosa’s case, Francisco did eventually file a spouse application form with the 
local USCIS office, and Rosa was granted conditional residency to remain in 
the country.  She was also granted employment authorization, which allowed 
her legally to obtain employment.94 
However, Rosa, as a victim of domestic violence married to a United 
States citizen, may be eligible to file her own request for citizenship with the 
USCIS based on revisions to the immigration law enacted pursuant to the 
Violence Against Women Act of 1994.95  The sweeping legislation wrestled 
control over the acquisition of legal citizenship status away from the abuser 
and placed power squarely in the hands of the victim.96  Like mandatory 
 
1258 (Ariz. 1997) (holding that under Arizona law an offender is not entitled to a jury trial for a 
misdemeanor assault charge). 
 93. The term “victim/defendant” will be used throughout the remainder of this article to 
describe victims of domestic violence who find themselves as defendants in criminal court facing 
charges of domestic violence wherein their abuser is the state’s victim.  The term has been used 
by other authors to describe a similar set of circumstances.  See Cecelia M. Espenoza, Crimes of 
Violence by Non-Citizens and the Immigration Consequences, COLO. LAW., Oct. 1997, at 89-90. 
 94. For a detailed discussion of the process by which a United States citizen spouse can 
petition for citizenship status on behalf of his immigrant spouse, see Espenoza, supra note 6, at 
213-14. 
 95. See Immigration and Nationality Act § 204(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1154(a) (2000) [hereinafter 
INA]. 
 96. Id.  The revisions allow an alien spouse to file her own request for citizenship if she can 
demonstrate to the Attorney General that she has been battered.  Id. 
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intervention laws and policies, the changes to immigration laws providing 
protections to victims of domestic violence is the type of legal response for 
which anti-domestic violence advocates lobbied for years.97 
A successful VAWA petition with the USCIS requires the victim to prove 
three essential elements: (1) good faith marriage to U.S. citizen or legal 
permanent resident; (2) battery or extreme cruelty; and (3) good moral 
character.98  Once a VAWA application is approved, the applicant may be 
granted employment authorization and will be allowed to remain in the country 
until filing the necessary documents with the USCIS to adjust her status to 
legal permanent resident (“LPR”).99  In order to achieve the coveted LPR 
status, Rosa will have to prove to the USCIS that she is not otherwise 
“inadmissible.” 100 
If Rosa accepts a diversion plea offer, a standard plea offer, or if she is 
convicted of the domestic violence charge, she then faces two potential hurdles 
with the USCIS in her application for citizenship.  First, she will likely be 
unable to prove to the USCIS that she is of “good moral character,” a 
necessary element in the first stage of a successful VAWA application.  
Second, she may be found inadmissible by the USCIS and, therefore, be unable 
to achieve LPR status. 
1. VAWA Application Requirements: Good Moral Character and 
Aggravated Felony Convictions 
Rosa will have to show that she has good moral character in order for the 
USCIS to approve her VAWA petition.  The domestic violence assault charges 
will effect this determination.  Good moral character is not specifically defined 
under the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”), but the Act lists offenses, 
conduct, and behavior that can prevent an applicant from being found to have 
good moral character.101  In Rosa’s case, it can be argued that if she receives a 
sentence of confinement for more than one year she cannot be found to have 
good moral character because she has been convicted of an “aggravated 
felony,” despite the charge as a state-defined misdemeanor.102  The result is the 
same if she accepts diversion or a standard plea offer or if she is found guilty at 
trial.  The only way that she can be certain to prevent such a finding is by 
being acquitted after trial or otherwise having the case dismissed by the state. 
 
 97. See Rivera, supra note 1, at 464. 
 98. See Espenoza, supra note 6, at 167-69, 172-73. 
 99. See NATIONAL IMMIGRATION PROJECT OF THE NATIONAL LAWYERS GUILD, 
IMMIGRATION LAW AND DEFENSE § 4:63 (3d ed. 2003). 
 100. See INA § 212(a)(2), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2) (2000). 
 101. See id. § 1101(f). 
 102. See infra notes 107-11 and accompanying text. 
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The basis for such a harsh result is found in the definitions of “conviction” 
and “aggravated felony.”  Under the INA, a “conviction” can include an 
admission to acts that constitute the essential elements of a crime, coupled with 
some restriction on one’s liberty.103  Participation in a domestic violence 
diversion program will require Rosa to accept responsibility for the domestic 
violence assault, waive her right to trial, and subject herself to probation, 
eventually leading to dismissal of the charges.104  However, her participation in 
the diversion program will be deemed a conviction by the USCIS.105  Further, 
accepting responsibility for the assault pursuant to a standard plea offer by the 
state, where Rosa would be found guilty of the crime and a conviction entered 
in return for a lesser sentence of punishment or probationary terms, would be 
considered a conviction under immigration law.  Finally, the uncertainty of an 
outcome at trial given the fact that Rosa cannot be assured an acquittal renders 
the decision to pursue a trial a disconcerting alternative.  However, a trial is the 
best chance Rosa has of obtaining a result that will not be deemed a conviction 
pursuant to immigration laws. 
Particularly problematic is the domestic violence assault charge.  A state 
misdemeanor assault may fit the definition of an aggravated felony under 
federal law.106  The INA states that an aggravated felony includes a crime of 
violence for which the sentence imposed is at least one year of confinement.107  
The term “crime of violence,” in turn, is defined to include the use of physical 
force against another person.108  It can be argued that the definition of assault 
 
 103. INA § 101(a)(48)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(48)(A) (2000). 
The term “conviction” means, with respect to an alien, a formal judgment of guilt of the 
alien entered by a court or, if adjudication of guilt has been withheld, where— 
(i)  a judge or jury has found the alien guilty or the alien has entered a plea of guilty or 
nolo contendere or has admitted sufficient facts to warrant a finding of guilt, and 
(ii) the judge has ordered some form of punishment, penalty, or restraint on the alien’s 
liberty to be imposed. 
Id. 
 104. ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-3601(M) (2003). 
 105. See INA § 101(a)(48)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(48)(A) (2000). 
 106. See id. § 101(a)(43), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43). 
 107. See id. § 101(a)(43)(F)  Also, under Arizona law, a person convicted of a class one 
misdemeanor can receive punishment of up to three years of court monitored probation.  See 
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-902 (2003). 
 108. 18 U.S.C. § 16 (2003). 
A crime of violence means – 
(a)  an offense that has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of 
physical force against the person or property of another, or 
(b)  any other offense that is a felony and that, by its nature, involves a substantial risk 
that physical force against the person or property of another may be used in the course 
of committing the offense. 
Id. 
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in Arizona includes the use of force against another person.109  Thus, if Rosa is 
convicted of assault and sentenced to a term of imprisonment for at least one 
year, even if the sentence is suspended, she is barred from establishing good 
moral character for VAWA purposes.  The saving grace for Rosa in this 
scenario may be the fact that under Arizona law the maximum term of 
imprisonment for a class one misdemeanor is six months.110 
Additionally, changes to the INA as a result of VAWA II now allow the 
Attorney General to find that an applicant has good moral character despite a 
criminal conviction, if it is determined that the conviction is connected to the 
applicant having been battered or subject to extreme cruelty.111 
2. Inadmissibility for Crimes of Moral Turpitude 
If we assume that Rosa had been able to file a VAWA application with the 
USCIS that was approved prior to her arrest and prosecution, then she may still 
face great difficulty in attempting to adjust her status to LPR.  The reason for 
the difficulty is the requirement that persons seeking LPR status must prove 
that they are not inadmissible based on a conviction for a crime of moral 
turpitude.112  The essential question in determining whether a crime involves 
moral turpitude is whether the proscribed act, as defined by the law of the 
appropriate jurisdiction in which the act was committed, “includes elements 
which necessarily demonstrate the baseness, vileness, and depravity of the 
perpetrator.”113  Rosa was charged with three separate crimes – assault, 
disorderly conduct, and contributing to the delinquency of a minor.  An 
individual assessment of each charge is required. 
In Arizona, the analysis of whether a crime is one of moral turpitude has 
been most commonly addressed on appeal when a defendant has been denied a 
jury trial for a misdemeanor offense.114 
With respect to the assault charge, it is unlikely that a conviction for a class 
one misdemeanor assault, designated domestic violence, will qualify as a crime 
of moral turpitude under the INA.115  The Supreme Court of Arizona has found 
 
 109. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-1203(A)(1) (2003). 
 110. Id. § 13-707(A)(1). 
 111. INA § 204(a)(1)(C), 8 U.S.C. § 1154(a)(1)(C) (2000). 
 112. Id. § 212(a)(2)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A). 
 113. 3B AM. JUR. 2D Aliens and Citizens § 1829 (1998). 
 114. See, e.g., State ex rel. McDougal v. Stohson, 945 P.2d 1251 (Ariz. 1997); State ex rel. 
Baumert v. Superior Court, 618 P.2d 1078 (Ariz. 1980); Bazzanella v. Tucson City Court, 988 
P.2d 157 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1999). 
 115. Simple assault crimes are generally not considered crimes of moral turpitude.  See 3B 
AM. JUR. 2D Aliens and Citizens § 1830 (1998). 
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that an assault is not a crime of moral turpitude in its analysis of whether a 
defendant convicted of domestic violence assault was entitled to a jury trial.116 
Second, the Supreme Court of Arizona has reached the conclusion that 
disorderly conduct is not a crime involving moral turpitude in today’s modern 
culture.117  Therefore, even if Rosa is found guilty of committing the crime of 
disorderly conduct, and it is designated as a domestic violence offense, she 
should not be found inadmissible on the basis of a conviction for a crime of 
moral turpitude. 
Finally, Rosa has been charged with contributing to delinquency and 
dependency of a minor.  The statute provides that a person who acts, causes, 
encourages, or contributes to the delinquency or dependency of a child under 
the age of eighteen years can be found guilty of a class one misdemeanor.118  
Delinquency is defined as “any act which tends to debase or injure the morals, 
health or welfare of a child.”119  The definition of a dependent person includes 
a child “whose home, by reason of neglect, cruelty or depravity of his parents, 
or either of them, or on the part of his guardian, or on the part of the person in 
whose custody or care he may be, is an unfit place for such person.”120  In 
Tucson, victim/defendants similar to Rosa have been charged with 
contributory dependency or contributory delinquency where the alleged facts 
assert that a child was present in the home and witnessed the domestic violence 
incident.121  In Rosa’s case, the fact that she was holding her child in her arms 
when she scratched Francisco could serve as the basis for the charge.  
Remarkably, the Arizona Supreme Court has found that misdemeanor child 
abuse is not a crime of moral turpitude. 122 
3. Removal/Deportation for Crimes of Domestic Violence 
 
 116. See State ex rel. McDougal, 945 P.2d at 1253-54.  The case involved a designated 
domestic violence assault wherein the defendant sought a jury trial because a conviction for the 
crime would have prohibited the defendant from possessing firearms.  Id. at 1252.  The request 
was denied because the offense was not one involving moral turpitude.  Id. at 1258. 
 117. See State ex rel. Baumert, 618 P.2d at 1080. 
 118. ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 13-3612 – 13-3613 (2003). 
 119. Id. § 13-3612(1). 
 120. Id. § 13-3612(3)(g). 
 121. See id. § 13-3613(C). 
 122. See Bazzanella v. Tucson City Court, 988 P.2d 157, 160 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1999).  The 
defendant in the case sought a jury trial on the charges of misdemeanor child abuse because a 
conviction would jeopardize her employment and carry other collateral consequences.  Id. at 160-
61.  The court denied the defendant’s request.  Id. at 161.  The court found that misdemeanor 
child abuse is not an act of moral turpitude because the act involved a simple failure to perceive 
and act reasonably under the circumstances and did not involve a serious risk of physical injury to 
the child.  Id. at 160. 
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For the purposes of this section, assume that Rosa had been able to achieve 
LPR status.  She nonetheless will be at risk of removal from the country by the 
USCIS if she is convicted of a “crime of domestic violence.”123  The inclusion 
of domestic violence as grounds for removal/deportation was added to the INA 
by the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 
1996.124  It is significant to note that the provision was not enacted as part of 
the anti-domestic violence advocate sponsored VAWA I or VAWA II 
legislation.125 
A “crime of domestic violence” under the INA is a crime of violence 
committed against a person that stands in a specifically defined relationship to 
the offender.126  The spousal relationship between Rosa and Francisco qualifies 
as a type of relationship covered by the INA provision.  A crime of violence is 
not specifically defined in the INA.  Instead, the INA makes specific reference 
to the federal criminal code for the definition of a crime of violence.127  The 
federal definition of a crime of violence includes “an offense that has as an 
element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the 
person or property of another.”128  The class one misdemeanor assault charge 
faced by Rosa qualifies as a crime of violence because an argument can be 
made that the use of physical force is a necessary element of the offense.129 
Turning next to the crime of disorderly conduct, it is less likely that a 
conviction for this offense will render Rosa deportable.  The reason for the 
outcome can be found in the definition of disorderly conduct which does not 
require the use of physical force as an element.130  The result will turn on 
 
 123. INA § 237(a)(2)(E)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(E)(i) (2000). 
 124. See Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 
104-208, § 350, 110 Stat. 279 (1996). 
 125. See generally Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 
103-322, tit. IV, 108 Stat. 1796 (1994); Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 
2000, Pub. L. No. 106-386, tit. V, 114 Stat. 1464 (2000). 
 126. INA § 237(a)(2)(E)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(E)(i) (2000). 
 127. Id. 
 128. See 18 U.S.C. § 16(a) (2000). 
 129. Lynn Marcus, Director of the Immigration Law Clinic, James E. Rogers College of Law, 
The University of Arizona, informed the author that in her practice she has found that Tucson 
immigration judges do perceive a conviction for a class one misdemeanor assault as a grounds for 
removal/deportation under the INA (October, 2002) (on file with author). 
 130. Arizona’s statute regarding disorderly conduct provides: 
A.  A person commits disorderly conduct if, with intent to disturb the peace or quiet of a 
neighborhood, family or person, or with knowledge of doing so, such person: 
1.  Engages in fighting, violent or seriously disruptive behavior; or 
2.  Makes unreasonable noise; or 
3. Uses abusive or offensive language or gestures to any person present in a manner 
likely to provoke immediate physical retaliation by such person; or 
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whether Rosa is found guilty of the crime by engaging in fighting.131  Again, it 
can be argued that the act of fighting with another person requires the use of 
physical force rendering it a crime of violence. 
Finally, Rosa could be found deportable based on a conviction for a crime 
of child abuse.132  The crime of contributory dependency or contributory 
delinquency is designated a family offense in Arizona along with other similar 
crimes, including child abuse.133  It may be argued that a conviction for 
contributory dependency or delinquency falls within the child abuse grounds 
for deportability under the INA. 
Ultimately, given the above analysis, if Rosa participates in diversion, 
accepts a standard plea bargain, or is found guilty at trial on any of the charges, 
she will most likely be found deportable by the USCIS.  Fortunately, 
legislation enacted pursuant to VAWA II may provide relief for Rosa should 
she find herself in deportation proceedings.134  However, it would be a poor 
 
4. Makes any protracted commotion, utterance or display with the intent to prevent the 
transaction of the business of a lawful meeting, gathering or procession; or 
5. Refuses to obey a lawful order to disperse issued to maintain public safety in 
dangerous proximity to a fire, a hazard or any other emergency; or 
6. Recklessly handles, displays or discharges a deadly weapon or dangerous 
instrument. 
B. Disorderly conduct under subsection A, paragraph six is a class six felony. Disorderly 
conduct under subsection A, paragraph 1, 2, 3, 4 or 5 is a class one misdemeanor. 
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-2904 (2003). 
 131. Id. § 13-2904(A)(1). 
 132. INA § 237(a)(2)(E)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(E)(i) (1998). 
 133. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 13-3601 to 13-3625 (2003). 
 134. INA section 237(a)(7) provides: 
Waiver for victims of domestic violence 
(A) In general 
The Attorney General is not limited by the criminal court record and may waive the 
application of paragraph (2)(E)(i) (with respect to crimes of domestic violence and 
crimes of stalking) and (ii) in the case of an alien who has been battered or subjected 
to extreme cruelty and who is not and was not the primary perpetrator of violence in 
the relationship— 
(i) upon a determination that— 
(I) the alien was acting in self-defense; 
(II) the alien was found to have violated a protection order intended to protect 
the alien; or 
(III) the alien committed, was arrested for, was convicted of, or pled guilty to 
committing a crime— 
(aa) that did not result in serious bodily injury; and 
(bb) where there was a connection between the crime and the alien’s 
having been battered or subjected to extreme cruelty. 
(B) Credible evidence considered 
In acting on applications under this paragraph, the Attorney General shall consider 
any credible evidence relevant to the application.  The determination of what evidence 
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legal strategy to advise Rosa to participate in diversion or accept a standard 
plea bargain to the charges and then seek at best uncertain relief from 
deportation. 
C. Child Custody Implications 
Once Rosa navigates her way out of the criminal justice system with any 
result short of acquittal or dismissal of the charges, she then faces the 
imposition of mandatory policies in place in domestic relations law should 
Francisco challenge her for custody of their two children.135  Under Arizona 
law, there exists a presumption against awarding custody to domestic violence 
offenders.136  The domestic violence offender can rebut the presumption at a 
hearing on the merits.137  The presumption does not apply if the court finds that 
both parents have committed an act of domestic violence.138  However, Rosa 
would be at a disadvantage if she has a conviction for domestic violence as 
compared to no record of conviction against Francisco.  Rosa will have to 
show that she has proof of rehabilitation (i.e. completion of the domestic 
violence offender treatment program) to rebut the presumption against her 
receiving custody of the children.139  Additionally, she will have to testify 
regarding the past acts of domestic violence that Francisco has committed 
against her.  The net result may be the refusal of the court to impose the 
presumption against either party.  However, Rosa will remain at a disadvantage 
compared to Francisco who has greater access to resources (e.g., citizenship, 
employment, family support, housing).  It is inconceivable that the same 
advocates who sought the imposition of mandatory prosecution of domestic 
violence offenders contemplated the complicated web of harmful 
consequences in which Rosa, the victim/defendant, has been ensnared. 
D. Economic Independence 
One of the factors that can prevent some women from leaving an abusive 
relationship is the inability to support themselves and their children 
 
is credible and the weight to be given that evidence shall be within the sole discretion 
of the Attorney General. 
INA § 237(a)(7), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(7) (2000) (footnote omitted). 
 135. Fathers who batter mothers are two times more likely to seek sole physical custody of 
their children than are non-violent fathers.  See American Bar Association Commission on 
Domestic Violence, Prevalence, at http://www.abanet.org/domviol/stats.html (last visited Jan. 6, 
2004). 
 136. ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 25-403(N) (2003). 
 137. Id. § 25-403(O). 
 138. Id. § 25-403(N). 
 139. Id. § 25-403(O). 
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independent of the abuser.140  Thus, the ability of domestic violence victims to 
obtain employment outside of the home is critical in the fight against abuse.  
However, here too we find unintended consequences for Rosa resulting from 
her mandatory prosecution on the domestic violence charges.  Recall that Rosa 
had found a job as a childcare worker.  It is not uncommon for women 
similarly situated to Rosa in Southern Arizona to find employment in this 
field.141 
Rosa will lose her position as a childcare worker as a result of the 
mandatory arrest and prosecution.  The result is dictated by the regulatory 
scheme that requires childcare workers to obtain a valid fingerprint clearance 
card through the state Department of Public Safety.142  The law requires that 
child care personnel submit two items to their employer: (1) a certification 
form; and (2) a valid class one or class two fingerprint clearance card.143  The 
fact that Rosa has been arrested and is awaiting trial for the charge of 
contributing to the delinquency or dependency of a minor, which is a charge of 
child abuse,144 will preclude Rosa from being issued a class one or class two 
fingerprint clearance card by the Department of Public Safety.145  The child 
abuse charge will also prevent Rosa from being able to submit the certification 
form which requires her to certify that she is not awaiting trial on child abuse 
charges.146 
Even if contributing to the delinquency and dependency of a minor was not 
a crime of child abuse, the charge of assault and the domestic violence 
designation of all of the offenses would preclude Rosa from obtaining the 
requisite fingerprint clearance, unless she can prove a good cause exception.147  
A good cause exception can include consideration of any mitigating 
circumstances.148  In theory, Rosa could ask for a good cause hearing before 
the board and present evidence of the prior abuse by her husband and her 
actions of self-defense in an effort to prove mitigation.149  However, Rosa has 
no financial ability to hire legal counsel to represent her before the board.  She 
has limited education, training, and English language proficiency.  It is 
 
 140. See Dutton et al., supra note 87, at 269-71. 
 141. See generally INSTITUTE FOR WOMEN’S POLICY RESEARCH, THE STATUS OF WOMEN IN 
ARIZONA: POLITICS, ECONOMICS, HEALTH, DEMOGRAPHICS (2000). 
 142. ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 36-883.02(A), 41-1758.03 (2003). 
 143. Id. § 36-883.02(A). 
 144. The term “dependency” as defined under section 13-3612, the statute under which Rosa 
has been charged, mirrors the definition of “dependent child” pursuant to the state juvenile court 
and child abuse provisions.  ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 8-201(13), 13-3612(3)(g) (2003). 
 145. Id. §§ 41-1758.03(B)(11, 14). 
 146. Id. § 36-883.02(C)(1). 
 147. Id. §§ 41-1758.03(C)(4), (C)(58). 
 148. Id. § 41-619.55(E)(4). 
 149. Id. § 41-619.55(B). 
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difficult to imagine how she would be able to successfully obtain a good cause 
exception for the issuance of a class one or class two fingerprint clearance 
card. 
VIII.  VAWA DIVERSION AND OTHER CONSIDERATIONS 
Rather than a wholesale elimination of all mandatory policies and laws 
outlined in this article, I propose the implementation of discretionary 
prosecution under select circumstances as warranted by identified case facts.  
The approach necessarily requires a level of trust by and between criminal 
justice system actors, anti-domestic violence advocates, and members of 
historically oppressed groups that has heretofore been unrealized.  The 
alternative leaves victims like Rosa in the cross hairs of intersecting policies 
enacted to address domestic violence as a serious public concern without 
regard to the consequences that leave devastated victims their wake.  I argue 
for the imposition of this discretionary model for immigrant victims of 
domestic violence who are also facing charges of misdemeanor domestic 
violence.  The proposal attempts to address two concerns: (1) that victims of 
domestic violence are identified as early as possible by the prosecutor’s office, 
even when the victims enter the system as defendants; and (2) that 
victim/defendants in domestic violence cases progress through the criminal 
justice system in a manner that renders them more capable of ending the 
violence in their lives rather than keeping them trapped in a cycle of violence. 
A. Individualized Case Assessment by Prosecutorial Staff Specifically 
Trained in Identification of Domestic Violence Victims 
To the extent that agreement exists between advocates and state actors that 
domestic violence is a crime requiring particular attention, resources should be 
devoted to specially train prosecutors to identify and recognize the particular 
forms of coercive control that abusive spouses use against immigrant victims 
of domestic violence.150  Early identification of these cases will allow for the 
provision of appropriate case disposition alternatives that do not yield the 
unintended consequences discussed above. 
B. VAWA Diversion and Other Case Disposition Options for 
Victim/Defendants in Domestic Violence Cases 
Once identified, prosecutors should be given discretion to offer an array of 
case disposition alternatives that will allow the victim/defendant to address the 
 
 150. Advocates may argue that it is inappropriate and not legally required that prosecutors 
inquire into the citizenship status of defendants.  However, by the time the case is assessed by the 
prosecutor’s office, the citizenship status of the defendant would likely have been discovered 
through processing at the municipal detention center or county jail. 
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violence in her life in a safe and responsible manner, but do not render her 
deported, childless, and unemployed.  An alternative that has proved successful 
in the Clinic service area is commonly referred to as VAWA diversion.151  The 
VAWA diversion alternative is really a misnomer because the 
victim/defendant is not required to admit facts sufficient to sustain a conviction 
for a domestic violence offense.152  Instead, the case is held open in the pre-
trial phase while the victim/defendant completes counseling.153  The number of 
hours of counseling required is determined by the prosecutor, and the 
counseling must be obtained through a program that is appropriate for the 
needs of a victim of domestic violence.154  After the requisite number of 
counseling hours has been completed, the case is voluntarily dismissed by the 
prosecutor, and the victim/defendant is allowed to exit the system without a 
conviction or the resulting negative immigration law consequences.155  Any 
concerns about repeat offenders can be relieved by the official recognition of 
the VAWA diversion as a legitimate case disposition.  Accordingly, the 
prosecutor’s office may want to implement a policy that a defendant may only 
participate in one VAWA diversion program in her lifetime. 
Other options such as creative plea bargaining should be explored.  
Creative approaches to plea bargaining may include carefully drafted plea 
agreements that reduce the charge to a non-domestic violence offense and a 
non-violent offense with a maximum term of probation that does not exceed 
one year. 
In Rosa’s case, a reduction of the assault charge to a class three 
misdemeanor would provide greater assurance against deportation on the 
grounds of conviction for a crime of violence.156  Similarly, basing the 
disorderly conduct charge on something other than fighting (i.e., unreasonable 
noise) could aid in preventing deportation.157  Accordingly, an attractive 
prosecution offer for Rosa might include an outright dismissal of the 
contributing to the delinquency or dependency of a minor charge and a plea of 
guilty to the reduced charges of assault and disorderly conduct.158 
 
 151. See discussion at supra note 78. 
 152. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-3601(M) (2003). 
 153. Id. 
 154. Id. 
 155. Id. § 13-3601(N)(1) (2003). 
 156. A class three misdemeanor assault in Arizona does not require the use of force as a 
necessary element of the offense.  See ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-1203(A)(2) (2003). 
 157. See id. § 13-2904(A)(2).  A disorderly conduct charge can be based on acts which do not 
require force as a necessary element of the offense.  Id. 
 158. It is the position of this author that although greater disposition alternatives should be 
available, participation in a diversion program or acceptance of a plea bargain should not be 
recommended when the defendant has a strong and credible defense and is likely to prevail at trial 
(i.e. self defense). 
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C. Referral to Immigration Legal Assistance Programs and Appointment of 
Public Defense Counsel 
Immigrant victim/defendants involved in domestic violence cases should 
be provided with referrals to immigration legal assistance programs so that 
appropriate remedies may be sought under the VAWA provisions of the 
INA.159  Further, resources must be made available so that victim/defendants 
can be afforded representation through the public defender’s office as the case 
outcome can have a substantial impact on their immigration status and rights in 
this country. 
D. Referral to Culturally-Specific Advocacy and Counseling Services 
Immigrant victim/defendants should be identified early and referred 
immediately to culturally-sensitive, anti-domestic violence advocacy service 
providers.  These agencies can provide counseling and other supportive 
services in a manner that recognizes the multiple identities of race, gender, and 
national origin of victim/defendants like Rosa.160 
E. Community Education and “Rosa’s Rights” 
The above-suggested proposals contemplate action after the initiation of a 
prosecution.  However, community education could lessen the potential for 
cases similar to Rosa’s from being referred for prosecution in the first instance.  
Agencies providing services to recently immigrated women are in a unique 
position to educate potential victim/defendants about their rights.  In Tucson, 
social service providers routinely hand out a card, in English and Spanish, 
which lists community resources available to victims of domestic violence.  A 
similar card can be created and distributed to the same population of victims 
informing them of their rights upon state intervention in a case of domestic 
violence.  The rights, “Rosa’s Rights,” should include: (1) the right to request a 
language interpreter at the scene; (2) the right to assert self-defense; (3) the 
right to report prior abuse; (4) the right to request medical attention; and (5) the 
right to request documentation of injuries. 
IX.   CONCLUSION 
 
 159. In the Clinic service area, Southern Arizona Legal Aid, Inc. [hereinafter SALA] provides 
legal assistance to victims of domestic violence that are eligible to file a self-petition for 
citizenship under the VAWA and VAWA II mechanisms.  It is common for SALA to refer their 
VAWA clients to the Clinic for criminal defense representation prior to filing the self-petition. 
 160. See generally Kimberle Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity 
Politics, and Violence Against Women of Color, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1241 (1991); M. Joan 
McDermott, On Moral Enterprises, Pragmatism, and Feminist Criminology, 48 CRIME & 
DELINQ. 283 (2002). 
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Overall, both anti-domestic violence advocates and state actors are seeking 
a reduction in the incidence of domestic violence in the community.  However, 
prosecuting agencies require additional and ongoing training by advocates on 
the particular concerns facing immigrant victims of domestic violence who 
may become criminal defendants in misdemeanor court.  Further, advocates 
need to trust that the exercise of discretion by prosecutors in offering 
disposition alternatives will not diminish progress made in getting state actors 
to treat domestic violence as a serious criminal offense. 
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